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Abstract: Internet voting continues to enjoy wide interest from both research and
practice. Among the Internet voting schemes developed over the last decades, JCJ
/ Civitas stands out from the masses due to its innovative approach to resist voter
coercion. To achieve its ambitious goal, the scheme builds upon particularly restrictive
assumptions and an abstract credential handling rendering the scheme impractical for
real-world use. At ARES 2012, Neumann and Volkamer presented a proposal which
implements several of these assumptions (voter-side assumptions) and the credential
handling by the use of smart cards. While addressing these practical shortcomings of
JCJ / Civitas, their proposal did not take performance into account, and accordingly
its performance has not been evaluated. In the present work, we revise the ARES
proposal from a performance perspective in a security-invariant manner. Based on the
herein proposed revisions, we are able to conclude that the revised ARES proposal is
feasible to be used in real-world elections.
1 Introduction
Internet voting continues to be a topic interest and many states started conducting political
elections over the Internet. In order to be compliant with fundamental election principles,
Internet voting systems must meet a diversity of security criteria. Among the most sig-
nificant security criteria are vote secrecy and vote integrity. Since the early 80s, starting
∗The original version of this paper appeared in Lecture Notes in Informatics (LNI), Volume P-220, INFOR-
MATIK 2013 – Informatik angepasst an Mensch, Organisation und Umwelt, Editor: Matthias Horbach, ISBN:
978-3-88579-614-5
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with Chaum’s seminal work on Internet voting [Cha81], many scientific proposals have
been developed to address these criteria. One approach promising a particular form of
security is JCJ [JCJ05] and its derivation Civitas [CCM08]. JCJ / Civitas ensures secrecy
even in case the voter interacts with the adversary during the vote casting process, i.e.,
during vote casting, the adversary coerces the voter into casting a specific vote or the voter
intends to convince the adversary about the content of her vote in order to get benefits.
Furthermore, the scheme on the one side mitigates the risk of violating integrity by means
of voting material buying, i.e., adversaries are discouraged from buying voting material
to vote multiple times thereby maliciously influencing the election result. On the other
side the scheme prevents adversaries from forcing voters to abstain from the election, as
the adversary does not have any mechanisms to control the voter’s compliance. To ensure
security under such circumstances, the scheme foresees that each voter casts her vote to-
gether with a credential validating or invalidating her vote, whereas the adversary is left
uncertain about the validity of the credential and consequently about the validity of the
cast vote. Even though the security enforcement is elegantly addressed, the scheme relies
on a number of assumptions and an abstract credential handling rendering it impractical
for the real-world use.
To overcome these drawbacks, Neumann and Volkamer presented a proposal [NV12] im-
plementing several of these assumptions1 and the abstract credential handling of JCJ /
Civitas by the use of smart cards. Even though their proposal addresses practical problems
of the JCJ / Civitas scheme, their work has not considered performance and consequently
is not tailored towards performance, thereby leaving the community in doubt about its
practical impact. In the remainder of this work, we refer to their proposal as the NV12 pro-
posal, whereas the JCJ / Civitas scheme extended by the proposal is referred to as NV12
scheme.
The present work takes up the NV12 scheme. As a first contribution, the scheme is re-
vised from a performance perspective in a security-invariant manner, later on referred to
as revised NV12 scheme. Throughout this revision process, we determine which smart
card routines of the NV12 scheme can be replaced, removed, or outsourced to improve the
overall performance without affecting the underlying security model. As a second contri-
bution, based on recent smart card timings, the overall performance of the revised NV12
scheme is analyzed. Given the findings, we are able to conclude that the revisions pave the
way for the real-world use of the revised NV12 scheme.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows: In Section 2, we provide a brief
overview of the NV12 scheme and outline the underlying security model. In Section 3 we
specify the project setting within which this work has been developed. We furthermore
revise the NV12 scheme by modifying smart card routines and argue why these modifica-
tions do not affect the underlying security model. In Section 4, the revised NV12 scheme is
analyzed with respect to its performance on recent smart cards. Therefore, first, we assess
timings of basic smart card operations, second, we decompose the revised NV12 scheme
into its basic smart card operations and show that the revised NV12 scheme is feasible to
be used in real-world elections. The work is concluded in Section 5 and directions for
1In their work, the authors focus on assumptions that require the voter active and benign behavior to meet the
scheme’s security criteria, so-called voter-side assumptions.
future research are given.
2 The JCJ / Civitas Scheme and the NV12 Scheme
The JCJ voting scheme [JCJ05], developed in 2005, has been the first Internet voting
scheme satisfying the criteria of coercion-resistance, i.e., 1) secrecy of the vote is ensured
even if the adversary interacts with (coerces) the voter during the vote casting process, 2)
the adversary cannot force voters into forwarding their voting material, and 3) the adver-
sary cannot force voters into abstaining from the election. At the same time, the scheme
provides some kind of evidence in the integrity of the declared election result. Due to its
particular security guarantees, JCJ has gained wide interest in the research community.
In 2008, the scheme has been extended to the Civitas scheme [CCM08]. Civitas slightly
enhances the JCJ scheme from a theoretical point of view while the main focus lies on the
instantiation of cryptographic components and the implementation of the JCJ scheme. As
such, the Civitas implementation might build the basis for future real-world improvements
on the JCJ / Civitas scheme. In the remainder of this work, we use the term JCJ / Civitas
as integration of theoretical concepts of JCJ and practical deployments of Civitas.
2.1 Previous Improvements of the JCJ / Civitas Scheme
To settle our own contribution, we provide a short overview on works addressing the JCJ
/ Civitas scheme. Several works addressed JCJ / Civitas’ drawback with respect to its
tallying complexity: Among these works, there are the contributions of Smith [Smi05],
Weber et al. [WAB07], Araujo et al. [AFT10], Spycher et al. [SKHS11]. In summary,
the tallying process of the JCJ / Civitas scheme has been reduced from quadratic to linear
complexity in the number of cast votes.
Haenni et al. [KHF11] addressed the vulnerability of board flooding attacks in JCJ / Civi-
tas. Due to the fact that the scheme relies on an anonymous channel to cast votes, anybody
can cast arbitrary many votes on the bulletin board, thereby slowing down or even blocking
the tallying process2. To prevent these kind of attacks, the authors propose to provide each
eligible voter with her real credential and furthermore with a random but fixed number of
so-called dummy credentials.
In [BHM08], Backes et al. presented a formalization and security proof for JCJ in the
applied Pi-calculus. Smyth et al. [SRKK10] adopted the approach of [BHM08] to the
Civitas scheme. Ku¨sters and Truderung [KT09] propose a coercion-resistance definition,
which differs slightly from the original. Based on that definition, they analyzed Civitas and
discovered two coercion-resistance flaws. Correspondingly, they suggested improvements
of the scheme. Shirazi et al. [SNCV11] identified a robustness vulnerability of the Civitas
scheme and proposed improvements addressing this drawback.
2Note that this attack applies to both linear and quadratic complexity tallying approaches.
Bursuc et al. [BGR12] introduced the concept of trial credentials in order to improve
the overall understandability of verifiability of the JCJ / Civitas scheme. Neumann and
Volkamer [NV12] and Mendes [dSM11] addressed the problem of credential management
in JCJ / Civitas by the use of smart cards.
2.2 The NV12 Scheme Overview
The NV12 scheme builds upon the robustness extension by Shirazi et al. [SNCV11]. The
NV12 scheme is motivated by the fact that the JCJ / Civitas scheme relies on a number of
abstract assumptions and an abstract credential handling. Similar to the work by Mendes
[dSM11], Neumann and Volkamer address several of these assumptions and the credential
handling by the use of smart cards. The NV12 scheme comprises the following entities:
A supervisor who is in charge of running the election and declaring election authorities;
the voter who intends to cast her vote; the voter’s smart card that serves as trusted device
between the voter and the JCJ / Civitas system; a registrar who administrates the electoral
register; a supervised registration authority and a set of registration tellers that provide
the voter with her credential; a set of tabulation tellers that are in change of the tallying
process; a set of ballot boxes to which voters cast their votes; and a bulletin board that is
used to publish information.
Setup Phase. The supervisor sets up the election and publishes details about the ballot
design. The registrar publishes the electoral register together with the voters’ public keys.
The tabulation tellers distributively generate the election key pair and publish the corre-
sponding public key pkEK . Each registration teller thereafter generates randomly chosen
private credential shares for all eligible voters. They encrypt these private credential shares
with the public election key resulting in public credential shares and publish these public
credential shares next to the voter’s entry within the published electoral register. More
formally, for a specific voter registration teller i publishes Si = {cRTi}rpkEK , where cRTi
is the voter’s credential share.
Registration Phase. As opposed to the original JCJ / Civitas scheme, the NV12 scheme
distinguishes between an offline and an online registration phase. In the offline phase, a
voter v personally consults a so-called supervised registration authority (SRA). The au-
thority checks that the voter is not under direct influence of any coercers. The voter is
requested to insert her smart card3 into the smart card reader. The voter is invited to set her
voting PIN. Afterwards, the supervised registration authority stores the private credential
share cvSRA generated for that voter on the voter’s smart card. In JCJ / Civitas manner,
along with the private credential share, the authority generates a designated-verifier re-
encryption proof (DVRP) that convinces only this voter’s smart card about the fact that the
public credential share published on the bulletin board in the setup phase is a re-encryption
3This might be a special-purpose smart card or an electronic ID card, which stores the voter’s private key, the
registration tellers’ public keys, and the smart card algorithm outlined in the remainder of the section. Although
not explicitly pointed out in the paper, the public election must be stored on the smart card. For the sake of
robustness, we assume that each registration teller provides the public election key to the smart card to detect
faulty behavior of individual registration tellers.
of the private credential share sent to the voter4. The voter leaves the supervised registra-
tion authority and the offline registration phase is finished. In the online phase, the voter
remotely connects to the election website, which allows her to finalize the registration pro-
cess. The voter is asked to chose her preferred registration tellers out of the set of available
registration tellers5. The voter’s selection of registration tellers is forwarded to her smart
card upon which the smart card asks the voter to confirm her selection over her smart card
reader. Thereafter, the IDs of trusted registration tellers are stored on her smart card. For
voter v, the trusted registration tellers are denoted by TRT(v). Afterwards, the card es-
tablishes secure connections to the trusted registration tellers via the client machine and
obtains the private credential shares cvRTi , an encryption S
′
i = {cRTi}r
′
pkEK
of cRTi to-
gether with the DVRPs from each individual teller proving that Si and S′i contain the same
message. After the card obtained all private credential shares and verified the DVRPs,
voter v’s card computes and stores v’s credential as
c = cSRA ·
∏
i∈TRT (v)
cRTi
Voting Phase. Once, the voter finalized the registration, she can start the voting process.
Therefore, she visits the election website upon which a JavaScript is loaded. The voter
can make her selection within the JavaScript. After the voter finalized her selection, the
selection is forwarded to her smart card which randomly encrypts the voter’s selection. In
cut-and-choose manner (NV12 implements this with the Benaloh challenge [Ben06]), the
voter can audit the correctness of the running JavaScript, i.e., the voter can verify that the
JavaScript forwarded really the voter’s selection. After the voter is convinced about the
correctness, she is asked to confirm her choice by inserting her voting PIN on the smart
card reader. If the voter enters her real PIN, the voter’s real credential is associated to
her vote, otherwise a random (invalid) credential is used. Formally, the voter’s smart card
generates a ballot of the form
〈{c}pkEK , {vote}pkEK , σ, φ〉.
The terms {c}pkEK and {vote}pkEK are a private credential and the voter’s vote both en-
crypted with public election key. σ is a proof of well-formedness (PWF) which shows that
the encrypted vote {vote}pkEK contains a valid choice, while φ is a zero-knowledge proof
(PKCV) which shows that the submitter knows both c and vote in order to avoid replay
attacks. The smart card computes the hash value hash(〈{c}pkEK , {vote}pkEK , σ, φ〉) and
outputs this on the smart card reader. Even though, the smart card implementation results
in a more practical JCJ / Civitas implementation, it must be noticed that neither the ad-
versary nor the voter obtain any integrity-assuring evidence after the PIN has been typed.
Given the fact that human beings notoriously tend to mistype or forget PINs, passwords,
etc. [FH07], the NV12 scheme bears new challenges from a practical point of view which
have to be considered in the future. Thereafter, the smart card casts the prepared ballot
anonymously to all available ballot boxes. Upon receipt, each ballot box computes the
hash value of the obtained ballot and publishes this value on the bulletin board.
4The nature of this proof allows a coerced voter to replace her private credential share by a random number
and forward this number to the coercer who is not able to tell real or a fake credential apart.
5According to [SNCV11], the voter must chose at least half of the available registration tellers.
Tallying Phase. In the tallying phase, all tabulation tellers retrieve the ballots from all
ballot boxes and the public credentials stored on the bulletin board. Zero-knowledge proofs
are verified, duplicates (due to vote-updating) and unauthorized votes (due to the use of
fake credentials) are eliminated. Finally, encrypted credentials of remaining ballots are
discarded and the respective encrypted votes are distributively decrypted. Each step of the
tabulation tellers is publicly verifiable based on a set of zero-knowledge proofs.
2.3 Security Model
This subsection is dedicated to the security model underlying the NV12 scheme. We use
the secrecy and integrity definitions from Budurushi et al.’s work [BNOV13], while the
forced-abstention resistance is inspired by the JCJ scheme [JCJ05]. For each criteria,
we provide assumptions on which the respective criterion is built upon. While most of
these assumptions trace back to the original NV12 scheme (assumption index of [NV12]
is indicated in parentheses6), some assumptions are stated more precisely and their need is
justified.
Secrecy. For each voter who casts a vote for an arbitrary candidate c, it holds that the
adversary cannot get more evidence about the fact that the voter selected c or any other
selection c′ as he can get from the final tally. With respect to secrecy, the adversary is
restricted as follows:
• Each voter trusts at least half of the remote registration tellers and the supervised
registration authority. (TA1)
• The adversary is neither able to corrupt smart cards nor smart card readers. (TA2)
• The adversary is not able to corrupt more than k out of all n tabulation tellers. (TA6)
• There is a point in the voting phase, in which the adversary cannot control the voter.
Justification: If this assumption would not hold, the voter would never have a chance
to cast her real intention and would implicitly prove to the adversary that she ab-
stained from the election. Even though not mentioned in [NV12], this assumption
has been outlined by Clarkson et al. [CCM08] as part of their threat model.
• The adversary cannot control the client machine.
Justification: Generally, a voter has the chance to prepare several ballots over her
client machine (even though, the adversary does not know which intention is associ-
ated to her real credential. Unless the voter does not prepare a ballot for all possible
intentions, the adversary knows which intention has not been cast by a specific voter
which consequently violates secrecy.
It should be noted that adversarial capabilities not listed here must be countered by the
voting system. For instance, the voting system should maintain secrecy even in the case
6Note that Neumann and Volkamer in [NV12] refer to trust assumptions rather then assumptions.
the adversary coerces the voter into preparing a specific ballot thereby proving the content
of her cast vote. This criterion is usually referred to as receipt-freeness enriched by the
exclusion of randomization attacks as part of Juels et al.’s [JCJ05] coercion-resistance
definition.
Integrity. The aggregation of all eligible voters’ intentions matches the declared election
result. Following the definitions of Budurushi et al. [BNOV13], integrity is composed
of the sub-criteria encoded-as-intended, cast-as-encoded, stored-as-cast, eligibility, and
democracy integrity. With respect to integrity, the adversary is restricted as follows:
• The adversary is neither able to corrupt smart cards nor smart card readers. (TA2)
• The adversary is not able to corrupt all ballot boxes. (TA5)
Here, it should be noted that simulation attacks, defined as part of coercion-resistance, are
covered by eligibility/democracy (depending on the fact if the adversary is also an eligible
voter) integrity. Furthermore, both criteria build upon the following assumption:
• The adversary is restricted to probabilistic polynomial time computations and cryp-
tographic primitives work. (TA7)
In [BNOV13], an Internet voting scheme is said to be end-to-end verifiable if integrity is
ensured without posing restrictions on the adversary. We relax this statement and con-
sider an Internet voting scheme end-to-end verifiable if integrity is ensured under the sole
assumption that the adversary is restricted to probabilistic polynomial time computations
and cryptographic primitives work. According to this definition, the NV12 scheme is not
end-to-end verifiable.
Forced-abstention Resistance. The adversary does not get any evidence if the voter ab-
stained from the election. Apart from randomization and simulation attacks, coercion-
resistance as defined in [JCJ05] ensures resistance against forced-abstention attacks. To
ensure forced-abstention resistance, the adversary is restricted in the same way as for se-
crecy, while one further assumption must be stated.
• The adversary cannot control or manipulate all nodes in the anonymization network.
(TA4)
3 Project Setting and Preliminary Considerations
In [NV12], Neumann and Volkamer address practical shortcomings of the JCJ / Civitas
scheme by integrating smart cards. However, their work did not consider performance
and consequently the performance of their proposal has not yet been investigated. In the
remainder of this work, we merely consider smart card performance rather than client
machine performance. This is justified by the fact that standard computers run routines
many times faster than smart cards. As outlined in the previous section, the NV12 scheme
involves the smart card in the registration and voting phases. Amongst others, the smart
card is used for the generation and verification of zero-knowledge proofs, the encryption of
data, establishing anonymous channels to the ballot boxes, and cut-and-choose techniques
as the Benaloh challenge.
Before diving into the revisions of this work, we outline the project setting within which
this work has been conducted. This setting allows us to slightly improve security and the
overall performance of the NV12 scheme. In the second part of this section, we provide the
reader with preliminary performance considerations and propose corresponding revisions
to the NV12 scheme. We base our modifications on security arguments to prove that these
modifications do not influence the security model underlying the NV12 scheme.
3.1 Project Setting
We first present the used smart card technology. Thereafter, we outline the type of elections
considered in the remainder of this paper.
Smart Cards. A number of different smart card operating systems exist. Among the most
established and wide-spread operating systems certainly, there are MULTOS7 and the Java
Card OS8. This paper has been developed as part of a research project in which Java Cards
NXP JCOP J20A80G are available which are built upon Java Card version 2.2.2. Hence,
it has been decided to rely on NXP JCOP J20A80G cards.
Simple Ballot Elections. The NV12 scheme provides encoded-as-intended integrity against
the client machine by the fact that the voter’s selection is encrypted by the smart card and
can be audited in cut-and-choose manner. In the general case, this proceeding is adequate
and recommendable. However, in the project setting, we consider simple ballots, e.g.,
single-vote plurality ballots. In the case of simple ballots, the cut-and-choose verification
process can be simplified as follows: Rather than inserting her intention over her client ma-
chine, the voter inserts her intention directly to the smart card over her smart card reader9.
In the latter case, one is able to save the computations of the Benaloh challenge. Note,
the consequence of this simplification is the elimination of the assumption ”The adversary
cannot control the client machine.” with respect to secrecy. Hence, the client machine
must only be trusted with respect to forced-abstention resistance. At this point, we do not
see a way to refrain from this assumption for the following reason: If the machine, over
which the voter’s smart card is connected, would be under adversarial control, the adver-
sary would be able to notice if the machine forwards data between the smart card and any
Internet service, in particular the Internet voting service provider
7http://www.multos.com/
8http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javame/javacard/overview/
getstarted/index.html
9For this purpose, we assume that prior to the election, enumerations of choices are publicly announced.
3.2 Revising the NV12 Smart Card Routines
The NV12 scheme did not consider implementation-specific details. As a consequence
thereof, the work proposed to implement most of the routines on the smart card. Based on
the fact that smart cards are generally highly resource-restricted, it is advisable to lower
the number of smart card operations if the underlying security model is not affected by
these modifications. The goal of this subsection is therefore to revise the NV12 scheme
with regard to smart card performance. This revision is a subtle process due to the fact
that security must not be compromised by any modification. Therefore, each modification
is substantiated by an argument relating it to the underlying security model.
There are three operations which are particularly crucial to the overall performance of the
NV12 scheme, namely designated-verifier re-encryption proofs, proofs of well-formedness,
and the establishment of anonymous channels. In particular the former proofs rely on mod-
ular integer division which is computationally intensive on smart cards as shown in section
4.1.
Designated-Verifier Re-encryption Proof. The DVRP is used to convince the smart card
about the fact that Si is a re-encryption of S′i which is shown to encrypt ci. The proof
prevents malicious registration tellers from providing invalid credential shares. The ver-
ification of a DVRP includes two subroutines [CCM08]: On the one side, there is the
ElGamal encryption of the received credential share ci. Each ElGamal encryption builds
upon one multiplication and two fast exponentiations (refer to [CCM08], p. 34, Algo-
rithm: ElGamal Encryption). On the other side, there is the essential verification to the
proof. This part of the DVRP relies on four divisions, six fast exponentiations, two addi-
tions, and one multiplication (refer to [CCM08], p. 39, Protocol: DVRP, Step 3). In view
of the fact that the smart card is trusted with respect to secrecy, the proof generation (and
proof verification) can be simplified: Rather than generating a DVRP, the registration teller
only needs to prove to the card that the published Si is an encryption of ci. Because of the
fact that the smart card is trusted and consequently there exists no routine to get any further
information from the card, the DVRP can be reduced to an encryption of ci by using the
randomness r that was used to generate Si. Hence, together with ci, the registration teller
outputs the randomness r and the card solely verifies if {ci}rpkEK equals Si and if Si is
signed by RTi and found on the bulletin board10.
Proof of Well-formedness. The PWF in the voting phase is used to prove that the voter’s
cast vote encodes one of the election options. As outlined by Haenni and Koenig [HK13],
the PWF serves to prevent adversaries from forcing voters into casting uniquely spoilt
ballots together with their real credentials. The PWF for ballots containing L candidates
builds upon L ElGamal encryptions, 2L divisions, 4L fast exponentiations, 4L multipli-
cations, 2L additions, and 2L subtractions (refer to [CCM08], p. 41, Protocol: ReencPf,
Step 1+2). It is furthermore worth mentioning that during the generation of PWF, there
are 8L+ 4 numbers stored. Each number needs 1536 bits and for L = 20 the PWF needs
31488 Bytes memory. A modern smart card has 80 KB memory from which are 64 KB
available. Ballots of the German Federal election in 2009 could not be handled properly;
10The smart card obtains the signed Si from the bulletin board via the client machine.
in Wiesbaden, voters had 117 possible combinations to vote11 which would result in the
smart card running out of memory. Given the fact that smart cards are trusted with re-
spect to secrecy, smart cards only generate ballots encoding valid choices or one single
invalid marking for all invalid choices. As a consequence thereof, one can refrain from the
generation of PWFs.
Anonymous Channels. The NV12 scheme proposes the establishment of anonymous
channels over the smart card to ensure forced-abstention resistance and to ease the bur-
den on the voter of establishing anonymous channels. Given the fact that a malicious
machine might always violate forced-abstention-resistance (see the argument in the Sim-
ple Ballot paragraph), there is no need to establish anonymous channels over the smart
card. In accordance to the original JCJ / Civitas scheme, anonymous channels between the
client-side and the ballot boxes are therefore entirely established over the client machine.
Several anonymization implementations are currently available on the market, e.g., TOR12
and I2P13. For the purpose of usability and to maintain forced-abstention resistance, we
propose the integration of an anonymization implementation into the JavaScript.
Revised NV12 Scheme. Integrating the outlined modifications into the NV12 scheme
results in the revised NV12 scheme. In the following section, the real-world feasibility of
the revised NV12 scheme is investigated.
4 Performance Analysis of the Revised NV12 Scheme
After the setting has been specified, several revisions permitted us to decrease the smart
card’s computational effort. The goal of this section is to analyze the revised NV12 scheme
with respect to its performance. To do so, first, timings for basic operations on smart cards
are assessed based on the work by Bichsel et al. [BCGS09]. Secondly, we decompose
the revised NV12 scheme into basic smart card operations allowing us to estimate the the
performance of the revised NV12 scheme.
4.1 Timings of Smart Card Operations
In this section we obtain timings for the modular operations addition (a + b mod p), sub-
traction (a − b mod p), multiplication (a · b mod p), and fast exponentiation (ab mod p)
on modern smart cards from Bichsel et al.’s work [BCGS09]. To benefit from hardware
acceleration as much as possible, subtraction and addition are both implemented using the
RSA-CRT encryption. Therefore we assume that addition and subtraction take approx-
imately the same time. Furthermore, Bichsel et al. map modular multiplication on the
crypto coprocessor. The modular division operation plays an extra role and is therefore
discussed below.
11http://www.bundestagswahl-2009.de/stimmzettel/
12https://www.torproject.org/
13http://www.i2p2.de/
The average time for 1536 bit numbers is provided in Table 1. We are aware of the fact that
a modulus of length 1536 as given in [BCGS09] does not provide adequate security. We
believe, however, that the progress in smart card technology keeps pace with the security
requirements such that modern smart cards might perform similarly for a modulus of 2048
bit.
Bitlength \Operation Addition Subtraction Multiplication Fast Expo.
1536 0.082 0.082 0.517 0.430
Table 1: Average Operation Times in Seconds (refer to [BCGS09])
One should notice that multiplication performs slightly slower than fast exponentiation.
This stems from the fact that multiplication and fast exponentiation are both mapped on
the crypto coprocessor. As opposed to the fast exponentiation, which is mapped onto
RSA encryption, the multiplication is mapped onto RSA chinese remainder theorem (CRT)
decryption, which has slightly lesser performance than RSA encryption. Due to this fact,
one RSA decryption takes as long as a multiplication and one RSA encryption takes as
long as fest exponentiation.
One might consider a further performance improvement, namely elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy (ECC). In contrast to finite fields, elliptic curves over finite fields allow to decrease
the key size and consequently increase the performance of cryptosystems without compro-
mising security. Due to its properties, ECC turns out to be highly valuable for low power
devices. Nevertheless, we had to exclude ECC from our further considerations for two
reasons: First, in order to benefit from the ECC performance gains, the smart card’s crypto
coprocessor must directly support ECC which is not the case in our scenario. Second, the
Civitas implementation in its current state does not integrate ECC and as a consequence
the Civitas backend would have to be modified which is beyond the scope of this work.
Before diving into the details of modular division, we must assess timings for integer
division on smart cards, which is generally not implemented on smart cards. One possible
way to calculate an integer division of the form ab is to recursively compute a := a− b
and count the number of recursions until a ≤ 0. Accordingly, one loop run results in one
addition (increase counter) and one subtraction. We optimistically assume five loops; one
shall see in the following why this optimistic assumption is valid for our case. Under this
condition one integer division takes 0.820 seconds for 1536 bit numbers.
To calculate modular division ab mod p, one has to solve a ≡ b · x mod p using the
extended euclidean algorithm, a standard algorithm for this task as described in [Abo04].
This algorithm needs needs one addition, one subtraction, two multiplications and one
integer division per step [Buc04]. The extended euclidean algorithm takes up to 2log(2) ·
logmin(a, b) steps. In analogy to integer division, we optimistically assume five steps.
Consequently, on average modular division results in 10.090 seconds for 1536 bit numbers.
At this point, it becomes clear that the the PWF and the DVRPs are performance crucial
routines.
4.2 Decomposing the Revised NV12 Scheme
In this section, we decompose the revised NV12 scheme into its basic smart card opera-
tions.
Registration Phase. In the registration phase, the NV12 scheme foresees to establish
secure connections to each registration teller via the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (NSL)
protocol [Low95] and to verify one DVRP for each registration teller. Additionally the
real credential is calculated right after all credential shares are received, namely |TRT |
credential shares are multiplied. The NSL protocol builds upon one RSA encryption and
one RSA decryption (refer to [CCM08], p. 45, Protocol: Register, Step 1-8).
As justified in section 3, the DVRP of each trusted registration teller is replaced by a simple
re-encryption of the obtained credential share. ElGamal builds upon one multiplication
and two fast exponentiations (refer to section 3).
In summary, the number of operations needed throughout the registration phase is given
as follows:
tregistration = (1 · tmul + 2 · texp + tRSAenc + tRSAdec) · |TRT |+
tmul · |TRT |
Voting Phase. According to [NV12], the voting phase builds upon two ElGamal encryp-
tions, one proof of well-formedness (PWF), and one zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
of the credential and the vote (PKCV). ElGamal needs one multiplication and two fast ex-
ponentiations (see above). The PKCV needs two fast exponentiations, two multiplications,
and two subtractions (refer to [CCM08], p. 41, Protocol: VotePf, Step 1).
As justified in section 3, the PWF is removed in accordance to the security model. Apart
from this modification, one might consider a further performance gain by initially selecting
a unique fake credential and pre-computing randomized credential encryptions: Depend-
ing on the fact if the credential used for the last vote was correct, the fake or the real
credential would need to be encrypted to vote. During the time the voter makes her selec-
tion, the smart card could already encrypt this credential, store both encrypted credentials
(fake and real) and use one of the two encrypted credentials after the voter submitted her
voting PIN. This approach is subtly flawed: The adversary could ask the voter to cast a
vote for a specific candidate associated with her real and her fake credential. If the voter
follows the adversary’s instruction, throughout the tallying phase, no duplicate would be
removed and the adversary could be sure that one vote will be tallied. Consequently, de-
pending on the voter’s submitted PIN pinx, her real credential or a PIN specific (invalid)
credential hash(pinx) is associated to the voter’s vote.
In conclusion, the performance of the revised voting phase is:
tvoting = 2 · tmul + 4 · texp +
2 · tmul + 2 · texp + 2 · tsub
4.3 Obtaining the Overall Performance of the Revised NV12 Scheme
After the smart card timings for the basic operations have been obtained and the number
of basic smart card operations has been assessed, we are able to draw conclusions about
the performance of the revised NV12 scheme. We assume five trusted registration tellers
to be a reasonable choice for high-stake elections.
tregistration = (1 · 0.517 + 2 · 0.430 + 0.430 + 0.517) · 5 +
0.517 · 5 = 14.205 s
tvoting = 2 · 0.082 + 4 · 0.517 + 6 · 0.430 = 4.812 s
The total time for the registration phase is around 14 seconds, while the time for the voting
phase is around 5 seconds. It can be concluded that the performance of the revised NV12
scheme is feasible and can therefore be used in real-world elections.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
After decades of theoretical research on the topic of Internet voting, scientific Internet
voting schemes come up trumps with promising security claims. One of the schemes
providing resistance to voter coercion is JCJ / Civitas [JCJ05, CCM08]. The scheme relies
on a number of assumptions and poses an insurmountable hurdle to the voter when it comes
to coercion due to the abstract credential handling. In 2012, Neumann and Volkamer
presented a proposal [NV12] that addresses these practical challenges by incorporating
smart cards into the JCJ / Civitas scheme. Certainly, the proposal serves as a step towards
the real-wold use of the JCJ / Civitas scheme. Nevertheless, their work did not center on
performance and as such their proposal is not tailored towards performance.
The present work is directed to close this gap. In the first part of our work, we revised
the NV12 scheme from a performance perspective and were able to replace, remove, or
outsource smart card operations in order to improve the overall performance. We showed
that these modifications did not affect the security model underlying the NV12 scheme.
Based on these revisions, in the second part of our work, we assessed smart card timings
for basic operations from recent literature and decomposed the revised NV12 scheme into
basic smart card operations. Summarizing these insights, we calculated smart card running
times of around 14 seconds for the registration phase and 5 seconds for the voting phase
of the revised NV12 scheme. We are convinced that these results prove the NV12 scheme
feasible to be applied within real-world elections.
Nonetheless, we plan to improve the overall performance for the registration phase and
the voting phase by further optimizations, e.g. the outsourcing of basic operations to the
client. We furthermore strive for discarding the client machine assumption also with re-
spect to forced-abstention. To date, the revised NV12 scheme assumes the voter not to
mistype or forget her PIN. This assumption might be too strong and consequently should
be reconsidered in future research. In the future, the revised NV12 scheme will be imple-
mented and used within test elections. Ultimately, we plan to evaluate and improve the
usability of the revised NV12 scheme by user studies.
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